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RDP Brute Force Attack on WIN-SERVER - Triage #001

Apr 19, 2026 Medium Wazuh SIEM - Agent WIN-SERVER (192.168.10.102)

True Positive #brute-force#rdp#windows-authentication#lateral-movement

Detection and investigation of an automated RDP brute force attack targeting the Administrator account on WIN-SERVER, originating from an internal Kali Linux machine.

Case and process

Case ID
INC-2026-0001
Analyst
Alain Tran (L1)
Reviewer
TBD (L2)
Escalated to
No — handled at L1. Monitoring ongoing.

Severity rationale

Medium: automated brute force attack confirmed via 175 failed authentication attempts in under 60 seconds targeting the Administrator account over RDP (port 3389). No successful authentication was recorded. Attack originated from an internal network segment (192.168.10.101), suggesting potential internal threat or compromised machine.

Context

At approximately 17:00, Wazuh SIEM triggered multiple authentication failure alerts on WIN-SERVER (192.168.10.102).
A total of 175 Event ID 4625 (failed logon) alerts were generated within less than 60 seconds, all targeting the Administrator account via RDP (port 3389).
The source IP 192.168.10.101 corresponds to a Kali Linux machine on the internal LAN segment managed by pfSense.

The volume of authentication failures strongly suggests an automated brute force tool (confirmed: Hydra was used in this lab simulation).

Investigation Steps

  1. Identified the alert spike in Wazuh Security Events dashboard — 175 Event ID 4625 in under 60 seconds.
  2. Confirmed source IP (192.168.10.101) and destination (192.168.10.102 — WIN-SERVER).
  3. Verified no successful authentication (Event ID 4624) occurred during the attack window.
  4. Checked RDP port 3389 exposure via Nmap from attacker machine — confirmed open at time of attack.
  5. Reviewed Windows Firewall rules — RDP was explicitly enabled prior to the attack.
  6. Confirmed attack tool via lab context (Hydra with rockyou.txt wordlist targeting RDP).
  7. Disabled RDP and closed SMB port after investigation.

Findings

  • 175 failed authentication attempts were recorded in under 60 seconds — a clear indicator of automated brute force.
  • All attempts targeted the Administrator account, a high-value default account.
  • The attack originated from 192.168.10.101 (Kali Linux) on the internal LAN — same network segment as the target.
  • No successful logon was detected during the attack window.
  • RDP (port 3389) was reachable from the internal network without additional authentication controls (no NLA enforced).
  • Wazuh rule level 5 was assigned — indicating a notable security event requiring investigation.

MITRE ATT&CK (Still learning… this mapping may contain errors)

TacticTechniqueID
Credential AccessBrute Force: Password GuessingT1110.001
Initial AccessExploit Public-Facing Application (RDP)T1190
Lateral MovementRemote Services: Remote Desktop ProtocolT1021.001

IOCs (Indicators of Compromise)

TypeIndicatorNotes
IP192.168.10.101Source of brute force attack (Kali Linux)
IP192.168.10.102Target machine (WIN-SERVER)
Port3389/TCPRDP — targeted service
AccountAdministratorTargeted account
Event ID4625Windows failed logon event
ToolHydraBrute force tool identified (lab context)
Wordlistrockyou.txtPassword list used in attack

Timeline

TimeEvent
16:55RDP enabled on WIN-SERVER for investigation purposes
17:00Hydra brute force attack launched from 192.168.10.101
17:00Wazuh begins recording Event ID 4625 alerts
17:01175 failed authentication attempts recorded in under 60 seconds
17:01Attack stopped (Ctrl+C) — no successful logon
17:05Investigation started in Wazuh Security Events
17:10Source IP and attack pattern confirmed
17:15RDP disabled, SMB port closed, containment complete
17:20Case documented

Outcome

The brute force attack was successfully detected by Wazuh via Event ID 4625 correlation.
No credentials were compromised. RDP access was disabled immediately after investigation.
The attack highlights the risk of exposing RDP on internal network segments without additional controls.

Remediation

Lessons Learned

  • RDP should never be exposed without Network Level Authentication (NLA) — enforce NLA as a baseline control.
  • Account lockout policies should be configured on Windows Server to automatically block accounts after N failed attempts (recommended: 5 attempts, 30-minute lockout).